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ABSTRACT 
This paper fills an important gap in the literature. It is the first systematic effort of 
addressing counterterrorism policy coordination failures due to transnational 
intertemporal externalities. As these externalities involve both spatial and time 
dimensions, non-cooperative policy coordination failures are better captured in a 
framework that allows us to consider two types of non-cooperative dynamic games, one 
in which national authorities are myopic and another in which they are farsighted.  We 
show that the steady state outcomes for both types of non-cooperative games are 
characterized by larger counterterrorism expenditures than their counterparts in the social 
optimum. The farsighted equilibrium always yields greater levels of counterterrorism 
expenditures, terrorist activities and violence than those produced by the myopic 
equilibrium. Thus, the distortion produced by the farsighted equilibrium is greater than 
the distortion produced by the myopic equilibrium. 
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Transnational Coordination Failures in Intertemporal Counterterrorism Games  
 
 The preeminent objective of bin Laden, explicit in some of his fatwas and messages (e.g. 
bin Laden et al. (1998)), is the restoration of a pan-islamic caliphate (Hoffman (2006, p.96); see 
also Cook (2006) and Hashim (2006)). The caliphate is considered as the golden age of Islam, 
identified historically as Islam's apex as a socio-economic and cultural system. The utilization of 
historical references as motivators for current and future actions clearly situates al-Qaeda as a 
terrorist organization which displays history-dependent preferences. This is also a common 
feature of other terrorist organizations. Psychologists call this phenomenon 'intertemporal 
organizational identification': an identification that promotes long-term legacy building. 
According to Fox et al (2010), the phenomenon of identification with past generations serve to 
facilitate the identification with future generations, since the connection between past and 
present are more easily clarified “than the connection between the present and the future" (Fox et 
al., 2010, p.175). Yet, psychological motivations to carry out terrorist activities cannot be easily 
separated from strategic considerations or motivations because psychological and strategic 
motivations are more likely to complement each other (see, e.g., Horgan (2005)). One of our 
main contributions is to show that strategic choices made by a terrorist organization featuring 
history-dependent preferences produce intertemporal terror externalities. 
 This paper is the first systematic effort of studying counterterrorism policy coordination 
failures due to transnational intertemporal externalities.1 We analyze dynamic games between 
two long-lived national governments which fight a common, long-lived, strategic, terrorist 
                                                 
1 The study of intertemporal externalities is well-developed in areas such as environmental and resource economics. 
Hartwick (1980), one of the pioneering papers in this literature, shows that market failure occurs with free access 
because an agent foregoing some “catch” today reaps in the future the discounted average (defined over the number 




organization. The key dynamic components of our model are fruits of the history-dependent 
preferences that characterize the behavior of the international terrorist organization. At any 
period, the terrorist organization derives complementary utility from past and contemporaneous 
levels of successful terrorist activities.2 This implies that optimal (strategic) choices made by the 
terrorist organization link past, present and future terrorist activities, and the links can be 
properly captured by terrorist evolution equations. The national governments design 
counterterrorism policies subject to the terrorist evolution equations. 
 We study coordination failures associated with both spatial and time dimensions of the 
national authorities' non-cooperative decision making. We consider three different games: one 
game in which the nations fully coordinate their counterterrorism policies and two games in 
which there is no coordination. In the first uncoordinated game, each nation is myopic in the 
sense that its decision making accounts for the evolution of terrorist activity that occurs within 
national boundaries only. In the second uncoordinated game, each nation is farsighted in the 
sense that its decision making accounts for the evolution of terrorist activities in both nations and 
it internalizes the feedback effects that its counterterrorism effort promotes one the other nation's 
counterterrorism effort. Since a nation's decision regarding counterterrorism action today affects 
the other nation today as well as in the future, the farsighted nations, unlike the myopic nations, 
formulate counterterrorism policies by accounting for both current and future joint feedback 
effects of their counterterrorism actions. A myopic nation neglects both current and future 
feedback effects produced by the other nation's reactions to its policy making. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 presents a 
simple model for one nation, which focuses on the dynamics emerging from the strategic choices 
                                                 
2 In this sense, our model is consistent with economic models of habit formation (see, e.g., Ryder and Heal (1973), 
Boyer (1978), Boyer (1983), Iannaccone (1986), Becker and Murphy (1988), Dockner and Feichtinger (1993)). See 
also Rozen (2010). 
3 
 
made by a terrorist organization characterized by history-dependent preferences and the optimal 
defensive counterterrorism policy implemented by a national government. After the key 
properties of the simple model are fully understood, in section 4 we extend it to two nations. In 
this extension, we capture the spatial (transnational) dimension of the externalities. We first 
examine the coordinated policy game, which is our efficient benchmark allocation. We later 
compare the results for the coordinated equilibrium with the results for the uncoordinated 
myopic equilibrium and the results for the uncoordinated farsighted equilibrium. We also 
compare the results for the two types of uncoordinated equilibrium. Discussion and concluding 
remarks are offered in section 5. 
 
2. Literature Review 
This paper investigates the key theoretical properties of transnational intertermporal externalities 
in dynamic counterterrorism games. A transnational externality exists if one nation’s action 
imposes uncompensated costs or benefits on one or more nation(s). If one nation’s action in the 
present imposes a cost or benefit on one or more nation(s) in the future, and no compensation is 
received or paid, then there is a transnational intertemporal externality (Enders and Sandler,2006, 
pp.140-141). 
 It is well-known that counterterrorism policies may give rise to transnational external 
benefits and costs. For instance, defensive counterterrorism actions, such as installation of metal 
detectors in airports, can create external costs by deflecting terrorist attacks from the country 
with metal detectors in airports to other countries with unprotected airports. Proactive 
counterterrorism, on the other hand, can generate external benefits. For example, a country that 
attacks and reduces the resources of a terrorist organization that is a common threat to other 
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countries generates an external benefit to them (Sandler, 2005).3 
 When a nation grants concessions to hostage takers it creates an intertemporal external 
cost to other countries, since terrorists believe that future hostage taking will be successful and 
increasingly profitable (Lapan and Sandler, 1993). If, however, instead of negotiating and 
granting concessions, the country applies a successful procedure for freeing hostages then it 
generates an intertemporal external benefit.  
 Externalities explain the collective action failures that plague countries fighting global 
terrorism. Since some proactive policies may provoke a terrorist backlash (Rosendorff and 
Sandler 2004; Siqueira and Sandler 2007; Faria and Arce 2011a) countries are less likely to 
cooperate among themselves and undersupply proactive counterterrorism; they rather resort to 
unilateral defensive counterterrorism, oversupplying it (Lee 1988; Lee and Sandler 1989; Sandler 
and Lapan 1988; Arce and Sandler 2005; Sandler and Siqueira 2006). These are standard results 
in static games.4 
 Our setup is an infinite horizon dynamic game played by two long-lived national 
governments which fight a long-lived international terrorist organization. Dynamic games in 
terrorism have been studied, among others, by Faria (2003), Feichtinger and Novak (2008) and 
Novak et al. (2010). Faria (2003) provides a pioneering theoretical framework to explain terror 
cycles.5 He examines a Stackelberg differential game in which terrorists are followers and the 
government is the leader. The dynamic optimization problem of terrorists yields a time path for 
terrorist attacks that is considered as an additional dynamic constraint for the government. The 
                                                 
3 Feldstein (2008, p. 126) notes that countries have an incentive to collaborate with the US because of its superior 
space-based technology for surveillance of electronic communication by voice and internet and for photographic 
reconnaissance. 
 
4 See Sandler and Arce (2003, 2007) for surveys on game theoretical approaches to terrorism. 
 




government maximizes national security subject to the evolution of law enforcement and the 
optimal reaction of terrorists. The model yields a limit cycle between government 
counterterrorism efforts and terrorist activities. 
 In Feichtinger and Novak (2008), the differential game between government and a 
terrorist organization is simultaneous. Both are subjected to the non-linear growth function 
dynamics of terrorist resources.  In the open-loop Nash solution, they show that if terrorists are 
more impatient than the government, the system (terrorist resources, government 
counterterrorism, and terrorist attacks) may exhibit long-run persistent oscillations. In a closely 
related framework, Novak et al. (2010) consider a state-separable differential game. Given 
specific parameter values, they show that in the Stackelberg equilibrium terrorists act more 
cautiously and the government more aggressively in comparison to their behaviors in the Nash 
equilibrium. 
 Our framework differs from the papers that examine dynamic terror games in (at least) 
three significant ways. First, the dynamics emerge from history-dependent preferences exhibited 
by the international terrorist organization. Second, we consider spatial and intertemporal 
externalities arising with uncoordinated counterterrorism policy making. Third, we consider 
myopic and farsighted counterterrorism policy making.  
 
3. Intertemporal Terror Game in a Single Nation 
We consider an economy with an infinite time horizon, 0,1,...,t   . There are two types of 
long-lived players, the government and a terrorist organization. 
 The government has the mission of minimizing the present value of the social loss 
function associated with terrorist attacks. We assume that the government is perfectly informed 
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about the terrorist organization's technology and payoff functions and that, in each period, it can 
perfectly observe and nullify a fraction of the quantity of terrorist attacks (i.e., the terrorist 
organization's output) before they cause violence. The government can also perfectly observe the 
remaining fraction of the quantity of terrorist attacks that succeed in producing violence in each 
period. However, the government cannot observe the terrorist organization's covert productive 
and managerial activities (e.g., recruitment, logistic and strategic planning, etc.). Thus, the 
government faces moral hazard vis-à-vis the myriad of organizational actions that the terrorist 
organization carries out to produce attacks.6  
 Let 0ta   denote the quantity of attacks in period t . At any period t , a fraction 
 0,1t  of attacks are successful in causing violence. The quantity of successful attacks in 
period t  is denoted t t ts a . Also, at any period t , the government exerts non-negative efforts 
in defensive counterterrorism activities.7 Let 0tg   denote the level of effective defensive 
counterterrorism effort in period t . Defensive effort reduces the quantity of attacks in period t  at 
a rate 0t  ; hence, t t tg a . If 0ta  , we have 1t t   . 
 We assume that the level of violence experienced by society in period t , tv , is equal to 
the quantity of successful attacks; namely, t tv s . If 0ta  , t t t tv s a g   . The social harm 
associated with tv  units of violence in period t  is  th v , where we assume that 
     0 0 0 0h h h     and    0th v  ,   0th v   and   0th v   for all 0tv  . The monetary 
                                                 
6 This is similar to the moral hazard problem faced by police enforcement which can detect and nullify some 
criminal activities but cannot observe the actions carried out by the criminals to "manufacture" the criminal 
activities. Also, in many instances, the identities of the criminals are unknown ex-ante and remain unknown ex-post. 
 
7 For tractability and in order to emphasize the intertemporal aspects of our model, we do not consider proactive 
counterterrorism efforts in this paper. The spillovers considered in the expanded model below emerge from 
defensive counterterrorism efforts. We are currently working on an extension of this paper's framework which 
incorporates proactive counterterrorism efforts. 
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cost of producing tg  units of counterterrorism effort is  tc g , where we assume that 
     0 0 0 0c c c     and   0tc g  ,   0tc g   and   0tc g   for all 0tg  . The social loss 
in period t  is the sum of the cost of providing counterterrorism effort and the damage caused by 
violence:      ,t t t tz g v c g h v  . The present value of the social loss function is, therefore, 
     
0 0
,t tt t t t
t t
Z z g v c g h v 
 
 
      , where  1 1 r    is the discount rate and 0r   is 
the interest rate. For concreteness, and in order to facilitate comparisons, we shall assume 
henceforth that   2t tc g g  and   2t th v v . These assumptions imply that the present value of the 








  . 
 We postulate that past successful attacks is one of the motivators for the planning and 
execution of attacks in any given period. Habit formation characterizes the behavior of the 
terrorist organization: at any period, it derives complementary utility from past and 
contemporaneous levels of successful attacks. As we shall see below, for a long-lived terrorist 
organization, habit formation implies that past, present and future acts of violence are 
interlinked. 
 Formally, in any period t , we assume that the terrorist organization's utility function is 
   1 1, , ;t t t t t t t t t tu u s s y g y bs s g s      ,  0b  , where 0ty   denotes the contemporaneous 
level of a composite good (i.e., numeraire) consumed by the terrorist organization. If 1 0ts   , 
this formulation is consistent with economic models of habit formation and addiction (see, e.g., 
Becker and Murphy (1988), Boyer (1978), Boyer (1983), Dockner and Feichtinger (1993), 
Iannaccone (1986), Ryder and Heal (1973)) in that the intertemporal behavior of the terrorist 
organization features "adjacent complementarity." This complementarity follows from the facts 
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that the marginal utility associated with the level of successful attacks in period t ,  
1t t tu s b s     , is increasing in the level of successful attacks in period 1t   and the marginal 
utility associated with successful attacks in period 1t  , when evaluated in terms of the utility at 
period t , 1t t t tu s s g    , is increasing in the level of successful attacks in period t . It is also 
important to note that the latter is increasing in the level of counterterrorism effort supplied by 
the government in period t . By including the level of counterterrorism effort in the terrorist 
organization's utility function, we are allowing for another potential type of intertemporal 
incentive to produce terror activity: if contemporaneous terror activity leads to an increase in the 
government's counterterrorism effort level in the next period, it will also lead to an increase in 
the social loss faced by the government due to the increase in the cost of combating terrorism. 
This is in accordance with the view that one of the key objectives of terrorist organizations is to 
weaken the government's economic position (see, e.g., bin Laden et al (1998) and Gartenstein-
Ross (2011)). We, therefore, assume that the terrorist organization derives utility from violence 
and the economic cost faced by the government in combating terrorism, namely, from both 
components of the government's social loss function. 
 Note that the terrorist organization may find it advantageous to supply attacks in period t  
even if the government was successful in avoiding all violence attempts in period 1t   (i.e., 
1 0ts   ).
8 However, it is not rational for the terrorist organization to supply attacks at period t  if 
it expects that 1 0t ts s   . 
 We assume that the technology employed by the terrorist organization is characterized by 
decreasing returns. This seems to be a realistic assumption due to the nature of the "terrorist 
                                                 
8 In the games examined below, the terrorist organization makes its decisions after it observes governmental policy 
commitments. It is, therefore, able to calculate if it is optimal to supply attacks in any given period.  
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business," which involves a short-time perspective (since its operation must be constantly 
switching locations or tactics in order to prevent detection and apprehension) and there are 
various types of fixed or setup costs in recruiting, planning, attack preparation and attack 
execution. 
 Assuming that the terrorist organization finds it desirable to supply a positive level of 
attacks in period t  (an assumption that holds in equilibrium, as we demonstrate below), the 
consumption level of the numeraire good in this period is 2 2t ty y f a   . We assume that
0y f  , where y  denotes the periodic amount of income available to the terrorist 
organization, f  represents the periodic fixed cost the terrorist organization incurs to carry out its 
activities and 2 2ta  is the variable operational cost. For notational simplicity, we assume that 
0f   henceforth. We also assume that the terrorist organization is always capable of raising 
sufficient income to finance its variable costs and that this fact is common knowledge (i.e., the 
government knows this as well); namely, y  is sufficiently large so that 2 2ty a .   
 The present value of utility for the terrorist organization, if it supplies a positive level of 
attacks in each period, is 
       221 1
0 0
, , 2; 1 2t tt t t t t t t t t t
t t












   and  22
0 0
2 2t tt t t
t t
a s g 
 
 
   . This intertemporal utility 
function makes it clear that past, present and future benefits and costs associated with the supply 
of attacks are interlinked. These intertemporal linkages produce a legacy of terror. 
 In the infinite-horizon game played by the government and the terrorist organization, we 
assume that the government makes its intertemporal policy choices in full anticipation of the 
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intertemporal choices made by the terrorist organization and that there is common knowledge. 
We can thus consider a setting in which the government announces its policy commitments, 
  0,...,t tg   , and the terrorist organization makes its intertemporal choices,   0,...,t ta   , after it 
observes the government's announcement.9 We derive a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for 
the infinite-horizon game. 
 Having observed the government's announcement,   0,...,t tg   , the terrorist organization 
makes its intertemporal choices to maximize    21
0
2t t t t t t t
t




       subject to 
1 1 0a g   , t t ts a g   if t ta g , 0ts   if t ta g , 1 1 1t t ts a g     if 1 1t ta g   and 1 0ts    if 
1 1t ta g  . As we shall demonstrate below the first order conditions for the optimization 
problems solved by both players ensure that 0t ta g   for all t  in the steady state. Assuming 
that 1 0ts    and 0ts  , the first order conditions for the current problem with respect to ta  and 
1ta   yields 
1 1 1t t t ta a b a g                (1a) 
1 2t t t ta a b a g      .         (1b) 







a b a g





      
          
.        (1c) 
  
                                                 
9 Alternatively, one can assume that the government announces the counterterrorism effort rates,   0,....,t t   . Since 
t t tg a  for t , this alternative game yields the same subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium as the one examined in 




Let J  denote the Jacobian matrix of coefficients of the linear system (1c). Note that J  is 
positive definite. Its determinant, J , is equal to 1 0  . The positive definiteness of J  
implies that the solution to the linear system (1c) is unique and the sufficient condition for the 
maximization problem is satisfied. By Cramer's rule, the solution of the linear system (1c) is 
given by 
   21 2 11 1t t t t ta b a a g g              ,      (1d) 
   1 1 2 12 1t t t t ta b a a g g          .       (1e) 
Equations (1d) and (1e) reveal that the optimal choices for any two adjacent periods are 
increasing in past and future attack levels and decreasing in current and past counterterrorism 
effort levels. The intertemporal effects are easy to explain. Past and future attack levels yield 
positive effects because of habit formation. Attacks in the current and next periods will thus 
bring future benefits (beyond next period) and the anticipation of such benefits motivate the 
terrorist organization to supply a higher level of attacks in the current and next periods. As for 
the intertemporal effects caused by counterterrorism effort levels, we see that past and current 
effort levels reduce the levels of current and future attacks. Thus, they lower the net benefits 
associated with the legacy of terror. The linearity of the transformed terrorist organization's 
payoff function with respect to the benefits and costs of supplying past and contemporaneous 
attack levels implies that the terrorist organization optimal attack levels are not functions of 
future counterterrorism effort levels.10 
                                                 
10 Had we considered the first order conditions with respect to the levels of successful attacks rather than with 
respect to the attack quantities, the successful-attack response functions would have been 
     21 2 21 1t t t t ts b s s g g              and      1 1 2 2 12 1 1t t t t t ts b s s g g g                . 
They reveal that successful attacks are increasing functions of  2tg  , but decreasing functions of tg  and  1tg  . Since 
t t ts a g  , 1 1 1t t ts a g     and 2 2 2t t ts a g    , the success-attack response functions are isomorphic to the 
attack response functions (1d) and (1e). 
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 Multiplying equation (1d) by 1  and adding to equation (1e) yields 
1 2t t t ta a b a g     .         (1f) 
Equation (1f) informs us how (optimal) attacks evolve over time.11 By rewriting equation (1f) as 
 2 1t t t ta a a g b      , one important implication of habit formation becomes very clear: the 
level of attacks in period 2t  , 2ta  , increases with evolution of attacks from period t  to period 
1t  , 1t ta a  , as well as with the level of counterterrorism effort supplied by the government at 
period t , tg . As we will see below, this feature of our model implies that the level of attacks is 
an increasing function of counterterrorism effort in the steady state. The level of attacks rises 
with counterterrorism effort in the steady state at a rate 1 1  . 









      subject to the attack evolution equation (1f). The Lagrangian is 
     22 1 2 1 2 1 3 1
0
t
t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t
g a g a a b a g a a b a g    

      

              . 
The first order conditions are 
 2 2 0t t t tg a    ,         (1g) 
 1 1 1 12 2 0t t t tg a       ,         (1h) 
 1 1 1 12 0t t t t ta g         .        (1i) 
Combining equations (1g), (1h) and (1i) in order to eliminate the Lagrangian multipliers yields 
12 t t tg a g   .          (1j) 
                                                                                                                                                             
  
11 See Barros et al (2007) and Faria and Arce (2005, 2011b) for alternative frameworks that rationalize the equation 
that governs the evolution of terrorist activity in a nation. 
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The rationale for equation (1j) is straightforward. The left hand side of this equation gives us the 
net marginal social loss of combating terrorism in period t . The right hand side of the equation 
provides us with the effective net marginal social loss of combating terrorism in period 1t   
when this quantity is evaluated from the perspective of period t  - it is discounted by  . 
 In the steady state, tg g  and ta a  for all t . In the steady state, the equilibrium 
equations (1f) and (1j) yield  a g b    and  2g a   , respectively, provided that g b  
(which we have implicitly assumed, since this is required for an interior solution to the problem 
solved by the government). Hence, in the steady state, the terror organization supplies attacks 
according to the attack-supply function     ˆ max ,0a g g b   , for g  , and the 
government supplies counterterrorism effort according to the effort-supply function 
   ˆ 2g a a   , for a  . In the relevant range, where g b , the attack- supply function is 
positively sloped and its slope is large than one. In the relevant range, each extra unit of 
counterterrorism effort supplied by the government leads to a response of 1 1   units of terror 
activity by the terrorist organization. In addition, for all 0a  , the slope of the government's 
effort-supply function is positive, but it is less than one: each extra unit of terror activity supplied 
by the terror organization leads to a response of  1 2 1   units of counterterrorism effort by 
the government. In equilibrium, we obtain: 
 2* 1 0g b b    ,    2* 2 1 0a b      and  * * * * 1 0v s a g b       . (1k) 
Results (1k) confirm our earlier claim that the first order conditions for the optimization 
problems yield interior solutions and a positive level of successful attacks (and thus violence) in 
the steady state. It is also important to note that in the steady state 
     * * * * * *1 2 1 2g a s a            .     (1l) 
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Thus, the counterterrorism effort rate is higher than the attack success rate, implying that over 
50% of attacks supplied by the terrorist organization are avoided by counterterrorism measures. 
   
4. Transnational Counterterrorism Policy Games 
Having considered the optimal intertemporal and steady-state counterterrorism policies from the 
viewpoint of a single nation, we now expand our model to examine policy making from the 
perspective of two nations whose policy choices are interdependent. The nations are indexed by 
j , 1,2j  . 
 The terrorist organization represents a common enemy to both nations. Let , 0j ta   
denote the number of attacks faced by nation j  in period t . The level of successful attacks 
produced by the terrorist organization in nation j  in period t  is  , , ,j t j t j ts a , where ,j t  is the 
attack-success rate. Let , , ,j t j t j tg a  be the level of counterterrorism effort exerted by the 
government of nation j  in period t , where ,j t  is the counterterrorism effort rate. 
 A nation's counterterrorism effort may benefit or harm the other nation. We restrict our 
attention to positive external effects. We assume that , , , ,j t j t j t k ts a g g   , where the parameter  
  captures the positive marginal external benefit that the counterterrorism effort of nation k  
produces in nation j , , 1, 2,  j k j k  . To guarantee interior solutions in all games examined 
below, we assume that  0,1 2  . The assumption that 1 2   implies that a nation's 
counterterrorism effort produces a marginal reduction in successful attacks in its soil at least  
twice as large as in the other nation's soil. Note that if 1, 0ka   and 2, 0ta  , we have 




 In period t , we assume that the utility of the terrorist organization is 
       1, 2, 1, 1 2, 1 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 1 1, 1, 2, 2, 1 2, 2, 1,, , , , ; , .t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t tu s s s s y g g y b s s s s g g s s g g            
 
The marginal utility associated with a successful attack in nation j  in period t  is , 1j tb s  while 
the marginal utility associated with a successful attack in nation j  in period 1t  , evaluated in 
terms of the utility at period t , is , , ,j t j t k ts g g  . These indicate that the utility function is 
characterized by adjacent complementarity (habit formation) and that the intertemporal 
incentives to produce contemporaneous successful attacks in any nation increase with future 
counterterrorism efforts of both nations. The amount of numeraire good consumed by the 
international organization is  2 21, 2, 2t t ty y a a   . As before, we assume that y  is sufficiently 
large so that 0ty  , t , in all games examined below. 
 Having observed both nations' policy announcements, the terrorist organization chooses 
nonnegative  1, 2, 0,...,,t t ta a    to maximize
12 
   
2 2
1, 2,





t t t t t t t t
t
a a
a b a g g a b a g g  

     

          
  
  
The first order conditions yield, for , 1,2j k  , j k  
, , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1j t j t j t j t k ta a b a g g         ,       (2a) 
, , 1 , 2 , ,j t j t j t j t k ta a b a g g        .       (2b) 
The linear system of equations (2a) and (2b) can be written in matrix form as follows: 
                                                 
12 The payoff function for the terrorist organization is 
      
2 2
1, 2,





t t t t t t t t t t
t
a a
m a b a g g a b a g g b g g   

     

              
  
  
where  1m y    if , 0j ta  , 1,2j  , t . Since the terrorist organization takes ,j tg  as given for 1,2j   and 
t , the term   1, 2,1 t tb g g   is constant and can be omitted from the relevant objective function.  
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, , 1 , 1 , 1
, 1 , 2 , ,
1
1 1
j t j t j t k t
j t j t j t k t
a b a g g





       
           
.      (2c) 
As it is clear in equations (2a) – (2b), the maximization problem for the terrorist organization is 
completely separable in attacks across the targeted nations. Effectively, the terrorist organization 
solves two separate maximization problems, one for each targeted nation. For each j , the 
determinant of the Jacobian matrix of system (2c) equals 1 0  , implying that the Jacobian 
matrix is positive definite. This leads us to conclude that the sufficient second order condition is 
satisfied and the solution to the system of equations (2c) is unique. The solution is as follows: 
     2, , 1 , 2 , 1 , , 1 ,1 1j t j t j t j t j t k t k ta b a a g g g g                   ,   (2d) 
   , 1 , 1 , 2 , 1 , , 1 ,2 1j t j t j t j t j t k t k ta b a a g g g g                .    (2e) 
Multiplying equation (2d) by 1  and adding to equation (2e) yields 
, 1 , , 2 , ,j t j t j t j t k ta a b a g g       ,  , 1,2j k  , j k .     (2f) 
Equations (2f) provide us with the optimal rules that govern the evolutions of attacks in both 
nations. They incorporate the terrorist organization's intertemporal best responses to 
counterterrorism efforts promoted by the two nations. The intertemporal difference in attacks in 
nation j  , , 1 ,j t j ta a  , is more sensitive to this nation's counterterrorism effort than to nation k 's: 
it decreases at a one-to-one rate with respect to ,j tg  and at a  -rate with respect to ,k tg . Due to 
the transnational external effects associated with counterterrorism effort levels, the evolutions are 






4.1. Coordinated Transnational Counterterrorism Policy Making 
As a benchmark for future comparisons, we first examine the constrained globally efficient 
allocation which results from minimizing the sum of the nations' intertemporal loss functions 
subject to the evolution of attacks in each nation. This problem is mathematically identical to the 
problem solved by an international coalition consisting of both nations which makes fully 
coordinated choices of counterterrorism efforts accounting for the optimal responses of the 
terrorist organization.  
 The Lagrangian for the international coalition is 
   
   
 
2 22 2
1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1,
0
1, 1, 1 1, 1, 2 1, 2, 1, 1 1, 2 1, 1 1, 3 1, 1 2, 1
2, 2, 1 2, 2, 2 2, 1, 2, 1 2, 2 2,
    
    
t
t t t t t t t t
t
t t t t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t
g g a g g a g g
a a b a g g a a b a g g
a a b a g g a a
  
     
   


       
   
       
 
           
       

 1 2, 3 2, 1 1, 1 .t t t tb a g g       
 
Since the objective function is strictly convex in all arguments and the constraints are linear, the 
first order conditions are necessary and sufficient for a global minimum. As we shall 
demonstrate below, the solution, when evaluated in the steady state, is strictly positive and finite. 
The first order conditions yield the following equations: 
   1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2,2 t t t t t t t t t tg a g g a g g               ,    (3a) 
   2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2,2 t t t t t t t t t tg a g g a g g               ,    (3b) 
   1 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 2, 1 2, 1 2, 1 1, 1 1, 1 2, 12 t t t t t t t t t tg a g g a g g                        ,   (3c) 
   1 1, 1 1, 1 1, 1 2, 1 2, 1 2, 1 1, 1 1, 1 2, 12 t t t t t t t t t tg a g g a g g                        ,  (3d) 
 1 1, 1 1, 1 2, 1 1, 1, 12 t t t t t ta g g           ,       (3e) 
 1 2, 1 2, 1 1, 1 2, 2, 12 t t t t t ta g g           .        (3f) 
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Equation (3a) informs us that the level of counterterrorism effort supplied by nation 1 that 
minimizes the constrained collective loss function for the international coalition at period t  is the 
level at which the coalition's net marginal loss from providing counterterrorism effort equates the 
weighed sum of shadow costs for the constraints that govern the evolutions of attacks in both 
nations at period t . Equation (3b) has a similar interpretation for the optimal level of 
counterterrorism effort supplied by nation 2 at period t  and equations (3c) and (3d) are the 
counterparts of equations (3a) and (3b), respectively, for period 1t  . Equation (3e) states that 
the optimal level of attacks in nation 1 at period 1t   is the level at which the marginal harm 
from violence faced by this nation equates the intertemporal difference in the shadow costs of the 
constraints. The international coalition wishes to minimize attacks in nation 1, but it must 
account for the optimal intertemporal responses of the terrorist organization. A reduction in the 
number of attacks at 1t   relaxes the constraint at this period but tightens the constraint at t . 
This is the rationale for the intertemporal difference in the shadow costs. Since the marginal 
harm from violence faced by nation 1 corresponds to this nation's marginal benefit of reducing 
violence, equation (3e) informs us that the optimal rule equates the marginal benefit of reducing 
violence at period 1t   to the net intertemporal cost of doing so. The interpretation for equation 
(3f) is similar to the one for equation (3e) and thus it deserves no further comment. 
 Combining equations (3a) and (3b) yields 
     2 3 2 2, , , ,2 2 1 1tj t j t k t j tg g a             , , 1,2j k  , j k .   (3g) 
Similarly, combining equations (3c) and (3d) yields 




Combining equations (3e) - (3h), we obtain for , 1,2,   j k j k  : 
      
   
1 2 2 3 2
, 1 , 1 , 1 , , ,
1 2 3 2
, 1 , 1 , 1
2 1 2 2 1
                                                    2 2 1 .
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j t j t k t j t k t j t
t
j t k t j t
a g g g g a
g g a
      





         
         
(3i) 
Equation (3i) informs us that the optimal intertemporal policy rules adopted by the international 
coalition equate each nation's marginal benefit of reducing violence at period 1t   to the nation's 
net intertemporal marginal cost of providing counterterrorism effort.  
 In the steady state, where ,j t ja a  and ,j t jg g  for all t , the coordinated equilibrium is 
determined by the following equations, for , 1,2j k  , j k : 
j k jg g a b    ,          (3j) 
     2 2 22 1 0j k jg g a            .      (3k) 
Equations (3j) and (3k) follow from equations (2f) and (3i), respectively. Due to the symmetry of 
our model, the solution to equations (3j) and (3k) is symmetric; namely, ja a  and jg g  for 
1,2j  . For future reference, note that the coordinated equilibrium equations simplify to 
   1g b a    ,          (3l) 
   21 1 1g a         .        (3m) 
Equations (3l) and (3m) follow from equations (3j) and (3k), respectively. As in the previous 
section, the reader is invited to view equations (3l) and (3m) as the expressions that yield the 
steady-state supply functions of attack and counterterrorism effort levels, respectively. Letting 
**a  and **g  denote the quantities that solve equations (3l) and (3m), we obtain 
     2 2** ** 1 1 1 1 0ja a b                    ,     (3n) 
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     2** ** 1 1 1 0jg g b             ,      (3o) 
   2** ** ** ** **1 1 0js s v a g b             .     (3p) 
Note that if 0   we have ** *a a , ** *g g  and thus ** *v v . This is natural because when the 
spillover index is zero the optimization problem faced by the international coalition can be 
separated into two independent constrained minimization problems, one for each nation. 
 The relevant comparative statics are 
      22** 2 1 1 1 0da d b           ,      (3q) 
       22 2** 1 1 1 0dg d b             ,     (3r) 
    22** 2 1 1 0dv d b         .       (3s) 
Results (3q) - (3s) reveal that, in the coordinated equilibrium, terrorist activity, government 
counterterrorism effort and violence decrease with the spillover factor. 
 
4.2. Uncoordinated Counterterrorism Policy Games 
We now consider two types of simultaneous uncoordinated counterterrorism policy games, 
depending on whether the nations are myopic or farsighted. We say that a nation is myopic if it 
only accounts for the impact caused by its provision of counterterrorism effort on the evolution 
of attacks that occurs within its national boundaries, taking the other nation's provision of 
counterterrorism efforts and their impacts as given. A nation is farsighted if it accounts for the 
impacts caused by its provision of counterterrorism effort on the evolution of terrorist activity in 
each nation, including the feedback effects produced on the provision of counterterrorism efforts 
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provided by the other nation. Thus, a farsighted nation does not take the other nation's 
counterterrorism efforts as given. 
 
4.2.1. Myopic Governments 
Each myopic government minimizes its loss function subject to the evolution of terrorist activity 
in its nation, taking both the choices of the other myopic government and the evolution of 
terrorist activity that occurs in the other nation as given. The Lagrangian for nation j  is 
   
 
22
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     
            
     

 
, 1,2j k  , j k . The first order conditions are 
 , , , , ,2 t j t j t j t k t j tg a g g        ,        (4a) 
 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 12 t j t j t j t k t j tg a g g             ,      (4b) 
1
, 1 , 1 , 1 , , 12
t
j t j t k t j t j ta g g   

         .       (4c) 
Equation (4a) informs us that the optimal level of counterterrorism effort at period t  for nation 
j  is the level that equates this nation's net marginal loss to the shadow cost of the periodic 
constraint which describes the evolution of terrorist activity in this nation. Equation (4b) 
describes the optimal rule for counterterrorism effort at period 1t  ; its interpretation is similar 
to equation (4a). Equation (4c) states that the optimal level of terrorist activity at period 1t   for 
nation j  is the level that equates this nation's marginal harm from violence caused by terrorist 
activity in such a period to the intertemporal difference in the shadow values of the constraints 
for periods t  and 1t  . Nation j  wishes to minimize the level of terrorist activity at period 1t   
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but it is constrained by the conditions that characterize the terrorist organization's optimal 
responses. A reduction in terrorist activity at 1t   relaxes the constraint describing the evolution 
of terrorist activity in such a period, but it tightens the constraint describing the evolution of 
terrorist activity in period t . This is the rationale for the intertemporal difference in the shadow 
costs of the constraints. Since the marginal harm from violence corresponds to the marginal 
benefit of reducing violence, equation (4c) informs us that the optimal rule for terrorist activity at 
period 1t   for nation j  equates this nation's marginal benefit of reducing violence in such a 
period to the intertemporal net marginal cost of doing so. 
 Combining equations (4a) – (4c) yields the following system of dynamic equations: 
, , , , , 1j t j t k t j t j ta g g g g      .        (4d) 
Equations (4d) inform us that nation j 's optimal intertemporal policy equates this nation's 
marginal benefit of reducing violence at period t  to the net intertemporal marginal cost of 
providing counterterrorism effort. 
 In the steady state, , 1 ,j t j t jg g g    and , 1 ,j t j t ja a a   , 1,2j  . Given the symmetry of 
our model, the steady state myopic equilibrium features jg g  and ja a , 1,2j  . For future 
reference, note that the equations that characterize the myopic equilibrium are (3l) and 
 2g a     .          (4e) 
Equation (4e) follows from equation (4d). Letting ma  and mg denote the myopic equilibrium 
quantities, we have 
    2 1 1 0ma b            ,       (4f) 
  1 1 0mg b        ,        (4g) 
   1 1 0m m mv a g b         .       (4h) 
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 Comparing results (3l) - (3n) with results (4f) - (4h) yields: 
Proposition 1. For 0  , **ma a , **mg g  and **mv v . 
Proof. First, **ma a  if and only if         2 22 1 1 1 1                 . The 
latter inequality holds if and only if 0  . Second, **mg g  if and only if 
    21 1 1          . The latter inequality holds if and only if 0  . Finally, 
**mv v  if and only if    21 1        . The latter holds if and only if 0  . ■ 
 The myopic nations ignore both contemporaneous and future transnational spillover 
benefits when they make their decisions. The comparison between equations (4a) and (4b) with 
their respective counterparts in the set of equations (3a) - (3d) makes it clear how the inefficient 
behavior of the myopic nations deviates from the behavior of the international coalition, which 
internalizes all spillover benefits. This differential in behavior is also captured by the discrepancy 
between equations (3m) and (4e). This is the sole distinction between the equations that 
determine the equilibria, since both equilibria satisfy equation (3l). In the 2  space, consider the 
variable g  as a function of the variable a  (thus, the values for g  are displayed in the vertical 
axis and the values for a  are in the horizontal axis). The curves that characterize the coordinated 
equilibrium are 
     1g a b a      ,         (4i) 
     2** 1 1 1g a a           .       (4j) 
The curves that characterize the myopic equilibrium are (4i) and 
   2mg a a      .         (4k) 
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Since equations (4j) and (4k) are identical to equations (3m) and (4e), respectively, the 
discrepancy between equations (3m) and (4e) is captured by the discrepancy between equations 
(4j) and (4k). Note that the slope of  ** a ,    21 1 1        , is greater than the slope 
of  m a ,  1 2    , for all 0a   because 0  . The slope of  ** a  is greater than the 
slope of  m a  due to the fact that the spillover effects are fully internalized in the coordinated 
equilibrium. This fact leads to the conclusion that **ma a  (this result would hold were  a  
decreasing, constant or increasing in a ). Since   0a   for all 0a  , we also have **mg g . 
Thus, the result that the myopic equilibrium features overprovision of counterterrorism effort 
follows from the positive slope of the terror-supply function,  a . As we pointed out earlier, 
the positive slope of this supply function derives its rationale from the fact that the terrorist 
organization cares about the legacy of terror (which is an immediate consequence of habit 
formation). In sum, as described by Proposition 1, the myopic equilibrium is characterized by 
higher terrorist and counterterrorist activities than the coordinated equilibrium. 
 
4.2.2. Farsighted Governments 
Farsighted governments make policy decisions in full anticipation of the evolution of terrorist 
activities in both nations. Each nation can see that its provision of counterterrorism efforts affects 
the evolution of terrorist activity in the other nation because of the positive spillovers in 
counterterrorism and that their efforts promote feedback effects through the other nation's 
provision of counterterrorism efforts. Each nation internalizes the feedback effects in its 
optimization problem. In this sense, each nation behaves as the international coalition. Formally, 
the constraint set faced by each nation in its minimization problem is identical to the constraint 
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set for the problem solved by the international coalition. Were, in addition, each farsighted 
nation altruistic, caring about the social costs incurred by the other nation as much as they care 
about their own social costs, the problem that would be solved by each farsighted nation would 
be mathematically identical to the problem solved by the international coalition. However, each 
nation only cares about its loss function, as in the myopic setting. Thus, the farsighted nations 
can be understood as a hybrid of myopic and fully coordinated governments.  
 Consider the equations that govern the evolutions of terrorist activities: 
1, 1 1, 1, 2 1, 2,t t t t ta a b a g g       ,        (5a) 
2, 1 2, 2, 2 2, 1,t t t t ta a b a g g       .        (5b)  
Solving equation (5a) for 1,tg  we can write 
   1, 2, 1, 1, 1 1, 2 1, 2 1, 1 1, 2,; , , , ,t t t t t t t t tg g a a a b b a a a g          .    (5c) 
Equation (5c) informs us that the contemporaneous counterterrorism effort of nation 1 is 
decreasing at one-to-one rate with the evolution of terrorism activity in this nation and also 
decreasing at a  -rate with the level of counterterrorism effort supplied by nation 2. Similarly, if 
we solve equation (5b) for 2,tg , we can write
13 
 2, 1, 2, 2, 1 2, 2 2, 2, 2 2, 1 1,; , , , ,t t t t t t t t tg g a a a b b a a a g          .    (5d) 
 Inserting  2, 1, 2, 2, 1 2, 2; , , , ,t t t t tg g a a a b   into equation (5a) enables us to write the evolution 
of terror activity in nation 1 from period t  to period 1t   as a function of subsequent terror 
activity, 1, 2ta  , the nation's contemporaneous counterterrorism effort, 1,tg , the other nation's 
                                                 
13 It is important to note that the functions described by equations (5c) and (5d) are derived from the terrorist 
organization's best-response functions. They do not represent the nations' best-response functions. They should be 
understood as "feedback functions". The nations' best-response functions are determined by taking the feedback 
functions into account. 
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evolution of terror activity from period t  to period 1t  , 2, 1 2,t ta a  , and the other nation's 
subsequent terror activity, 2, 2ta  : 
     21, 1 1, 1, 2 1, 2, 1 2, 2, 21 1t t t t t t ta a b a g a a a                .   (5e) 
If nation 1 anticipates that the evolution of terror activity in nation 2 leads to the relationship 
described by  2, 1, 2, 2, 1 2, 2; , , , ,t t t t tg g a a a b    and fully accounts for the impact of this relationship 
on the evolution of terror activity in its own soil, it correctly anticipates that the evolution of 
terror activity in its soil is described by equation (5e). Among other things, equation (5e) 
describes the evolution of terror activity in nation 1 as a function of direct and feedback (through 
 2, 1, 2, 2, 1 2, 2; , , , ,t t t t tg g a a a b   ) effects of the contemporaneous counterterrorism effort exerted by 
nation 1. This nation now clearly sees that its level of counterterrorism effort in period t , 1,tg , 
reduces the evolution of terrorist activity in its soil from period t  to period 1t  , 1, 1 1,t ta a  , at a 
rate  21 1  . When nation 1 is myopic, it perceives a unitary rate of reduction in the 
evolution of terrorist activity in its soil promoted by its provision of counterterrorism effort in 
each period. It is, therefore, clear that a farsighted nation perceives its counterterrorism policy as 
being less effective in reducing violence in its soil than a myopic nation. 
 Combining equations (5b) and (5c), we have 
     22, 1 2, 2, 2 1, 1 1, 1, 2 2,1 1t t t t t t ta a b a a a a g                .    (5f) 
Equation (5f) represents nation 2's perception of the evolution of terrorist activity in its soil.  
 The loss perceived by a farsighted nation j  at period t  is 
      22 2, , , , 1 , 2 , , , , , 2 , 1, ; , , 1fj j t j t k t k t k t j t j t j t k t k t k tz g a a a a g a g b a a a               ,  , 1,2j k  , 
j k .  The Lagrangian for nation j  is 
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where ,j t  and , 1j t   are the Lagrangian multipliers. For , 1, 2j k  , j k , the first order 
conditions are 
    2 2, , , , ,2 1 1t j t j t j t k t j tg a g g            ,      (5g) 
    1 2 2, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 12 1 1t j t j t j t k t j tg a g g                 ,    (5h) 
 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 ,2 t j t j t k t j t j ta g g           .       (5i) 
Equation (5e) informs us that the optimal level of counterterrorism effort in nation j  at period t  
is the level at which this nation's effective net marginal loss from providing counterterrorism 
effort is equal to effective shadow cost of the periodic constraint which governs the evolution of 
terrorist activity in nation j  at period t . The interpretation for equation (5f) is similar. The 
interpretation for equation (5g) is identical to the interpretation for the counterparts in the 
previous optimization problems. 
 Combining equations (5g) - (5i) yields 
  2 , , , , , 11 j t j t k t j t j ta g g g g        .       (5j) 
Equations (5j) inform us that nation j 's optimal intertemporal policy equates this nation's 
perceived marginal benefit of reducing violence at period t  to the net intertemporal marginal 
cost of providing counterterrorism effort. 
 In the steady state, the equilibrium is characterized by the following equations, for 
, 1,2j k  , j k : 
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     21 1j j kg b a a        ,        (5k) 
     2 2 21 2 1j j ka g g          .       (5l) 
Equations (5k) follow from equations (5e) and (5f) and equations (5l) follow from equations (5j). 
The farsighted equilibrium is symmetric (i.e., ja a  and jg g , 1,2j  ). The equilibrium 
quantities solve equation (3l), which also follows from equations (5k) given the symmetry, and 
      2 21 1 1 1g a           .       (5m) 
Equation (5m) follows from equation (5l). Letting the superscript " f " denote the quantities in 
the farsighted equilibrium, we have 
       2 21 1 1 1 1 1 0f fja a b                        ,   (5n) 
      2 21 1 1 1 0f fjg g b               ,     (5o) 
for 1,2j  . The common denominator in results (5n) and (5o) is positive because 
  21 1 1       
for  0,1 2  . Given results (5n) and (5o), we have f fjv v , for 1,2j  , where 
  21 1 0fv b          .        (5p) 
 Comparing results (4f) - (4h) with results (5n) - (5p), we obtain 
Proposition 2. For 0  , f ma a , f mg g  and f mv v . 
Proof. For f ma a ,          2 21 1 1 1 2 1 1                           , which 
is true if and only 2 0  . Similarly, f mg g  and f mv v  if and only if 2 0  . 
 In the 2  space, considering the variable g  as a function of the variable a , the curves 
that characterize the farsighted equilibrium are (4i) and  
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      2 21 1 1 1fg a a             . 
Since the slope of  f a  is smaller than the slope of  m a  for all 0a   and since   0a   
for all 0a  , we have f ma a  and f mg g . The slope of   f a  being smaller than the slope 
of  m a  is consistent with our earlier observations that the farsighted nations perceive their 
counterterrorism policies as being less effective in reducing violence than the myopic nations. 
 Combining Propositions 1 and 2, we can write: 
Proposition 3. For 0  , **f ma a a  , **f mg g g   and **f mv v v  . 
 As Proposition 3 makes it clear, the farsighted equilibrium is the least efficient one. 
Letting **z , mz  and fz  denote the loss amounts faced by each nation in the coordinated, myopic 
and farsighted equilibria, we can now affirm: 
Proposition 4. For 0  , **f mz z z  . 
Proof. Since    2 2f f fz g v  ,    2 2m m mz g v   and    2 2** ** **z g v  , we have 
**f mz z z    for 0   because      
2 2 2**f mg g g   and      2 2 2**f mv v v   for 0  .■ 
 
5. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
The simplest model examined in this paper, in which there are no transnational spillovers, we 
demonstrated that a terrorist organization, which cares about the legacy that terror promotes, 
finds it optimal to supply terrorist activity at a non-decreasing rate with the level of 
counterterrorism effort supplied by the government in the steady state. In the expanded model, 
we studied the impact of transnational intertemporal externalities on coordinated and 
uncoordinated counterterrorism policy making. The games involved three long-lived players, two 
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national governments and an international terrorist organization.  We considered two 
uncoordinated games, one in which both nations are myopic and another in which both nations 
are farsighted.14 A myopic nation makes decisions ignoring transnational spillovers. A farsighted 
nation makes decision fully accounting for the direct and feedback effects that terror promotes in 
both nations. A farsighted nation, however, does not care about the social costs that originate 
with terror activity in the other nation.  
The main model yields two important results. First, the uncoordinated equilibria are 
characterized by overprovision of counterterrorism efforts. Overprovision derives its rationale 
from the fact that the terrorist organization cares about the legacy that terror promotes. The 
incentives associated with the legacy of terror lead the terrorist organization to react positively to 
an increase in counterterrorism effort in the steady state; in fact, the rate at which terrorist 
activity increases in response to an increase in counterterrorism effort in the steady state is 
greater than one. 
Second, the farsighted equilibrium is the least efficient one, featuring higher 
counterterrorism efforts, higher terrorist activities and higher violence levels than the myopic 
equilibrium, with the latter featuring higher counterterrorism efforts, higher terrorist activities 
and higher violence levels than the coordinated equilibrium. The inefficiency of the farsighted 
equilibrium relative to the myopic equilibrium is due to the fact that each farsighted nation can 
see that the effectiveness rate of its counterterrorism efforts in reducing the evolution of terrorist 
activities in its soil is sensitive to the feedback effects that its counterterrorism efforts promote 
on the other nation's counterterrorism policy.  Nation j  knows that nation k  reduces its 
                                                 
14 An interesting avenue for future work is to consider a "supergame" in which the nations decide whether to be 
myopic or farsighted. To formally carry out this analysis, one would have to consider settings in which the nations 
are asymmetric, with one nation being myopic and the other being farsighted. One of the interesting issues that may 
be examined in this context is whether being farsighted is a dominant strategy for each nation. 
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provision of counterterrorism effort in each period by a rate equal to the spillover index   and 
also that each unit of counterterrorism effort supplied by nation k  in each period yields a 
spillover benefit also equal to the spillover index   to nation j . Hence, the marginal feedback 
effect felt by nation j  in each period is a loss of 2  units in the effectiveness of its 
counterterrorism effort in reducing the evolution of terrorist activity in its soil. Thus, a farsighted 
nation perceives that it must supply a greater level of counterterrorism effort in each period 
relative to a myopic nation in order to reach the same amount of reduction in the evolution of 
terrorist activity. The combination of a higher incentive to supply counterterrorism effort in the 
farsighted setting and the positive response of the terrorist organization associated with an 
increase in counterterrorism effort lead to the conclusion that the farsighted equilibrium is less 
efficient than the myopic equilibrium. 
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